Showing posts with label United States Supreme Court. Show all posts
Showing posts with label United States Supreme Court. Show all posts

Friday, November 16, 2012

Special Education Law 101 - Part IX

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This is the most recent post in the continuing series that is meant to be an introduction to special education law.  In today's post we will be discussing discipline of students with disabilities.  People often ask why disciplinary actions are regulated by the special education law.  The reason is that before passage of the law's predecessor, it was common for school officials to exclude children with disabilities by expelling them and giving them long suspensions. This series of abuses was reflected in the legislative history of the law.  
 
Discipline is one area that seems to cause folks to develop stomach problems (sorta like the rule against perpetuities in law school), but it isn't really as hard as we seem to make it.  Let me know if this explanation helps.

                                                   Discipline Issues

The IDEA imposes special rules that govern the discipline of students with a disability.  The basic rule is that a special education student may not have her placement changed (i.e., suspensions of more than 10 days or expulsion) for conduct that is a manifestation of her disability.  IDEA, § 615(k)(1)(F).  If the behavior is not a manifestation of the student’s disability, the student may be disciplined in the same manner and for the same duration as children without disabilities.  IDEA, § 615(k)(1)(C).

One exception is that, regardless of manifestation, the schools may remove a student to an interim alternative educational setting,  sometimes referred to as “IAES,” for up to 45 school days if (1) the student possesses a weapon at school; or (2) the student possesses or uses or sells illegal drugs at school; or (3) the student has inflicted “serious bodily injury” upon another person while at school.  IDEA, § 615(k)(1)(G).  The schools may also ask a hearing officer to change the placement of a student with a disability to an IAES if remaining in the current placement is substantially likely to result in injury to the student or others.  IDEA, § 615(k)(3)(A) and (B).

              Another cardinal rule in the discipline area is that regardless of whether the conduct of a student was a manifestation of the student’s disability, where a student with a disability is removed from his current placement, the schools must continue to provide educational services to ensure FAPE for the student and to enable the student to continue to participate in the general curriculum although in another setting.  IDEA, § 615(k)(1)(D).  See generally regarding discipline issues, 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.530 – 300.537. 
 
                The Supreme Court dealt with discipline issues and endorsed the stay put provision in the case of Honig v. Doe 484 U.S. 305, 108 S.Ct. 594, 559 IDELR 231 (1988).  In that decision, the Supreme Court, noting the Congressional intent in preventing the exclusion of disabled students and reiterating the importance of the procedural safeguards under the IDEA, refused to read a dangerousness exception into the stay put provision. The high Court outlines the history of abuses of the discipline of kids with disabilities in that decision.
 
 In District of Columbia v. Doe ex rel Doe 611 F.3d 888, 54 IDELR 275 (DC Cir 7/6/10) DC Circuit ruled that HO did not exceed his authority where he reduced a disciplinary suspension. HO reduced a 45 day suspension to an 11 day suspension noting the trivial nature of the infraction and finding that the more lengthy suspension denied FAPE to the student.


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Friday, October 26, 2012

Special Education Law 101 - Part VII

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This is another post in our current series introducing readers to special education law's key concepts.  Today's post is about related services. This phrase is almost always preceded by "special education and..."

Let me know if you are enjoying this series. For some it is an introduction.  For others it is a chance to brush up on the key concepts...

Related Services

The IDEA defines related services as follows:

(A)  IN GENERAL- The term ‘related services’ means transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and other supportive services (including speech-language pathology and audiology services, interpreting services, psychological services, physical and occupational therapy, recreation, including therapeutic recreation, social work services, school nurse services designed to enable a child with a disability to receive a free and appropriate public education as described in the individualized education program of the child, counseling services, including rehabilitation counseling, orientation and mobility services, and medical services, except that such medical services shall be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only) as may be required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special education…

(B)  EXCEPTION—The term does not include a medical device that is surgically implanted, or the replacement of such device.
IDEA, § 602(26).  See, 34 C.F.R. § 300.34.

              The issue of related services has resulted in two decisions by the United States Supreme Court.   The first decision was  Irving Independent Sch. Dist. v. Tatro  468 U.S. 883, 104 S.Ct. 3371, 555 IDELR 511 (1984).  The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals holding that a procedure known as clean intermittent catheterization was a related service because the student could not attend school without it and, therefore, without the procedure she could not benefit from special education.  Tatro, supra.  The Supreme Court also affirmed the holding of the Court of Appeals that clean intermittent catheterization is not exempted by the medical services provision because the procedure did not have to be performed by a doctor, it could be done by a layperson with an hour of training. Tatro, supra.

              The second decision was Cedar Rapids Community Sch. Dist. v. Garret F.  526 U.S. 66, 119 S.Ct. 992, 29 IDELR 966 (1999).  In this case, the Supreme Court held that urinary bladder catheterization and suctioning of tracheotomy plus various monitoring was a related service.  Garret F., supra.  Applying the “bright line” test of the Tatro decision, the Court held that because the related services did not have to be performed by a physician, the medical services exclusion did not apply and the schools were required to provide the services for the student.  Garret F., supra.  The Court specifically and emphatically rejected the argument raised by the schools that the cost of providing the services was a defense.  Garret F., supra. 

              In Marshall Joint Sch Dist No.2 v CD by Brian & Traci D 616 F. 3d 632, 54 IDELR 307 (7th Cir 8/2/10), the Seventh Circuit  concluded that the student did not need specialized instruction.  Any need for PT or OT, therefore, was not relevant.
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Tuesday, February 21, 2012

Procedural Safeguards The Series - Part IV

English: Figure 8.1 A Description of the Evalu...Image via WikipediaThis is the fourth installment in a multi-part series on procedural safeguards under the federal special education law, the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act. I work a lot in this area, so it is near and dear to my heart. Despite the importance of procedural safeguards. however, many issues in this area are misunderstood. I hope that all of the different types of special education stakeholders who read this blog find the information in this series helpful. Ple4ase tell me what you think about the series.

 
 
Independent Educational Evaluations

The parents of a child with a disability have the right to an independent educational evaluation (hereafter sometimes referred to as “IEE.”) IDEA Section 615(b)(1). The IEE must be provided by the school district at public expense unless the school district files a due process complaint and shows that its evaluation was appropriate. 34 CFR Section 300.502(b). The U. S. Supreme Court found the right to an IEE to be a very important safeguard for parents, and relied on it in part, in rejecting the argument that school districts had an advantage in terms of expertise and knowledge. Schaffer v. Weast 546 U.S.49, 126 S.Ct. 528, 44 IDELR 150 (2005).

Parents may obtain only one IEE at public expense each time the school district conducts an evaluation with which the parents disagree. 34 CFR Section 300.502(b)(5). The purpose of this regulation is to protect the parents’ right to an IEE (OSEP rejected a suggestion limiting a parent to one IEE in a child’s school career) while ensuring that a school district does not have to bear the cost of multiple IEEs concerning a single disagreement. 71 Fed. Register No. 156 at page 46690 (August 14, 2006).

OSEP has noted that where a hearing officer orders an IEE, parental consent is needed for the release of education records to the independent evaluator. If the parent refuses to consent, the hearing officer could decide to dismiss the parent’s complaint. 71 Fed. Register No. 156 at page 46690 (August 14, 2006).

If a parent obtains an IEE at public expense, but disagrees with the result, the school district could introduce it as evidence in a due process hearing. 71 Fed. Register No. 156 at page 46690 (August 14, 2006).

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Tuesday, January 31, 2012

Procedural Safeguards - The Series - Part I

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This is the first installment in a multi-part series on procedural safeguards under the federal special education law, the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act.  I work a lot in this area, so it is near and dear to my heart.  Despite the importance of procedural safeguards. however, many issues in this area are misunderstood.  I hope that all of the different types of special education stakeholders who read this blog find the information in this series helpful.
Procedural safeguards are extremely important under our system of special education.  In the first United States Supreme Court decision interpreting the predecessor of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. Section 1400, et seq (hereafter sometimes referred to as the “IDEA”), the Court stressed the importance of procedural safeguards in the statutory system adopted by the Congress, noting that the procedural safeguards gave parents a “large measure of participation at every stage of the … process.”  Board of Educ., Hendrick Hudson Central Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 455 U.S. 175, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 3038 and 3049, 553 IDELR 656 (1982).  The court went on to emphasize that compliance with the Act’s procedural safeguards is a critical component of a free appropriate public education. Rowley, supra 102 S.Ct. at 3051.
More recently, the Supreme Court rejected an argument that school districts should have the burden of persuasion due to an advantage in information.  The Court reasoned that Congress had leveled the playing field by requiring school districts to share information and protect the rights of parents by adopting the extensive system of procedural safeguards contained in the IDEA. “Schaffer v. Weast 546 U.S. _____,_____, 126 S.Ct. 528, 44 IDELR 150 (2005).
Section 615 of the IDEA is entitled “Procedural Safeguards,” and most procedural safeguards for parents are contained in that section.  However, some procedural safeguards are found in other sections of the Act or in the federal regulations.  In addition to the required Notice of Procedural Safeguards, Section 615(d), there are a number of specific procedural safeguards.  The specific procedural safeguards include the following: independent educational evaluation , Section 615 (b)(1) and 34 C.F.R. Section 300.502;  prior written notice, sections 615(b)(3)-(4) and (c)(1); informed parental consent, Section 614 (a)(1)(D); access to educational records, Section 615(b)(1); state complaints, 34 CFR Section 300.151, et seq; mediation, Section 615(e); child’s placement during a challenge or “stay put,” Section 615 (j); procedures for an interim alternative education, Section 615 (k); unilateral placement in private school when FAPE in issue, Section 612 (a)(10)(C); due process hearings, Section 615 (f); if a two tiered system, state appeals, Section 615 (q); civil actions appealing a due process decision, Section 615 (q); and attorneys’ fees, Section 615 (i)(C)(3).
 
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Saturday, January 22, 2011

Can There Be a Middle Ground on the FAPE Standard?

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One of the main guarantees of the special education law, IDEA, is that a child with a disability is entitled to a free and appropriate public education, or "FAPE."  

IDEA is overdue for reauthorization, which includes the opportunity to amend the law.  In the seminal special education ruling, the U. S. Supreme Court in Bd. of Educ, etc. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 178, 102 S. Ct. 3034, 553 IDELR 656 (1982)  established a two-part test for determining whether a school district has provided a free and appropriate public education to a student with a disability.  There must be a determination as to whether the schools have complied with the procedural safeguards as set forth in IDEA and an analysis of whether the Individualized Educational Plan (or  "IEP") is reasonably calculated to enable a child to receive some educational benefit.  A school district is not required to maximize the potential of a student or guarantee his success. 

School district lawyers generally say that the standard means that the child is entitled to a serviceable Chevy, not a Cadillac.

That was in 1982.  Since then many commentators, and one U.S. District  Court, have questioned whether the bar for FAPE should be higher.  

Unfortunately, though, most of the debate has been whether the standard should be "some benefit" or potential-maximizing. There has been no middle ground.  Sometimes compromise can be a good thing, or at least that's what Henry Clay said.  

So can there be a compromise on FAPE.  Can we create a standard that is more than some benefit, yet not as high as potential maximizing? So it would be not a starter Chevy or the top of the line Caddy, lets say a Chevy Tahoe? 

What do you think is there a middle ground?  Let me know.

By the way, I continue to be interested in your suggestions for changing IDEA.  Remember I am collecting them.  Thanks.


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Monday, November 29, 2010

Procedural safeguards The Series - Part VI

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This is the sixth installment in a multi-part series on procedural safeguards under the federal special education law, the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act. I work a lot in this area, so it is near and dear to my heart. Despite the importance of procedural safeguards. however, many issues in this area are misunderstood. I hope that all of the different types of special education stakeholders who read this blog find the information in this series helpful. Be sure to tell me what you think about the series.

There are four dispute resolution mechanisms provided by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq, (hereafter sometimes referred to as “IDEA”) and the accompanying federal regulations: mediation, state complaints, resolution sessions, and due process hearings. In addition, some states and districts are experimenting with fifth method-facilitated IEP meetings.


Special education disputes may be resolved through any of the five methods or by any combination of the methods. It is highly unusual under the law for an aggrieved party to be permitted to invoke more than one resolution option. Although mediation is often used in combination with litigation, it is rare for other formal methods to be combined. An unhappy party could file a state complaint wait for the results and then file a due process hearing over the same dispute. The same dispute can be submitted at any time in the process to mediation. A resolution session occurs in every due process filed by a parent unless waived or submitted to mediation in lieu thereof. It is true that if the complaint and due process are filed at the same time, the portions of the state complaint duplicating the due process complaint are held in abeyance until resolution of the due process, but if they are not filed at the same time, there is no prohibition upon the utilization of multiple methods.

Adding to the frustration of this lack of finality is the fact that the result of most of the options may also be appealed to one or more levels of the court system. The U. S. Supreme Court has noted that the judicial review process for special education cases takes a long time, referring to the appellate process as “ponderous.” Town of Burlington v. Dept of Educ 471 U.S. 358, 105 S.Ct. 1996, 556 IDELR 389 (1985).

This link is to the NICHCY Training Program – Module 18: Options for Dispute Resolution:


Here is the OSEP Questions and Answers (Document) On Procedural Safeguards and Due Process Procedures For Parents and Children With Disabilities:








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Monday, August 16, 2010

Big Changes to §504: Do They Affect Special Education - Part I

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As my summer rock tour on special education law continues, one theme is emerging: there have been big changes to §504 (through the ADA amendments by Congress.) The big question is how much these changes will affect the education of kids with disabilities.

At least three speakers, and many of the hallway conversations, during these conferences have directly addressed the changes to §504. One frequently heard comment is that the main dissatisfaction of the Congress with decisions involving §504 and the ADA in the employment context. Congress felt that the U. S. Supreme Court was interpreting the laws too narrowly and blocking many employees from going to court to be heard on the question of reasonableness of accommodations that they were requesting.

In particular Congress took issue with two lines of cases by the Supreme Court. One involved cases following Sutton v. United Airlines 527 US 471, 30 IDELR 681 (1999). Another involved cases following Toyota Manufacturing v. Williams 534 U.S. 184, 102 LRP 6137 (2002).

In the next part in this series, we will look at these cases and why Congress was upset.

Thursday, April 22, 2010

Justice Stevens and Special Education Law - Part II

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Justice John Paul Stevens has announced his retirement from the United States Supreme Court. Although originally considered a moderate by most, he has drifted to the liberal wing as the court added more and more very conservative justices. In addition to being a loyal fan of the Chicago Cubs, Justice Stevens left his mark on special education law.

Last week we reviewed his opinions in the big ten decisions by the Supremes in this area of the law. We also discussed in detail, the opinion he authored in Forest Grove v. TA. This week we will take a look at the other major opinion in this area authored by Justice Stevens.

In the case of Cedar Rapids Community School Dist v. Garret F 526U.S. 66, 119 S.Ct 992, 29 IDELR 966 (3/3/1999), Justice Stevens wrote the opinion for the seven justices who formed the majority. Near the beginning of the opinion, Justice Stevens notes that the student "... is a friendly, creative and intelligent young man." It was refreshing to see this emphasis upon the student whose education is being litigated.

The main issue in the case was whether the school district was required to provide urinary bladder catheterization, suctioning of a tracheotomy and various monitoring functions for the student. IDEA, the federal special education law requires a school district to provide as related services to students with a disability those related services that are necessary for the student to receive a free and appropriate education. There is an exception for "medical services" and the district argued that the exception applied. Justice Stevens reaffirmed the "bright line" test from the previous Tatro decision, holding that the medical services exception only applies to services that must be performed by a physician. Accordingly, the opinion requires the district to provide the related services at issue.

More important, in my opinion, is the manner in which Justice Stevens handled the school district's argument that the expense of the services should be a defense. The majority opinion squarely rejects the argument that the cost of providing services can be a defense in special education cases. This ruling has importance way beyond the facts of the particular case. I believe that this portion of the decision is Justice Stevens' true legacy concerning the body of law involving special education.

Note the President is a known fan of the dreaded Chicago White Sox. I fear that the chances of another Cubs fan being appointed to the Supreme Court are indeed very slim!